Mxxx vs. People (2026) — Can a Woman Be Charged with Rape in the Philippines?

G.R. No. 280727 Promulgated: February 4, 2026

Is this case rape? Why statutory acts of lasciviousness and not RA 7610? What's the penalty? Did the age of consent change?

A woman who sexually abused her 11-year-old nephew is liable for statutory acts of lasciviousness under Article 336 of the Revised Penal Code — not lascivious conduct under RA 7610 (because a child below the age of consent cannot give even the defective consent that RA 7610 presupposes) and not rape (because the rape law as worded in 2018 excluded a woman who, without consent, places a man's penis into her own vagina).

SYLLABUS: A 25-year-old aunt forced her 11-year-old nephew to have intercourse with her, then threatened to accuse him of rape if he told anyone. The boy was later diagnosed with PTSD and had contemplated suicide. The trial court and Court of Appeals convicted the aunt of a child-abuse offense under RA 7610. On final review, the Supreme Court affirmed that she was guilty but re-labeled the crime as statutory acts of lasciviousness under the Penal Code, explaining that RA 7610's framework assumes a child who "goes along" with the abuse, which an 11-year-old legally cannot do. The Court also explained why, under the old wording of the rape law, what she did was technically not "rape" — and used the case to argue that rape laws should be gender-neutral because men, too, can be victims.

FACTS:

• September 7, 2018 — Then-11-year-old Boyxxx visited his paternal relatives' house in Tondo, Manila. He first slept in his father's room but transferred to the air-conditioned room of Mxxx ("petitioner"), the half-sister of Boyxxx's father and Boyxxx's paternal aunt ("Tita"). Mxxx was 25 at the time.
• That night, Mxxx woke Boyxxx, ordered him to remove his clothes and lie on her bed, put a condom on his penis, mounted him, and inserted his penis into her vagina for about 10 minutes. She then told him to dress and to keep silent — threatening that she would otherwise claim he had raped her.
• Boyxxx said he did not protest at first because he was curious, but afterward felt ashamed and contemplated suicide.
• February 16, 2019 — Boyxxx maternal uncle was asked by Boyxxx's mother (working in Saudi Arabia) to confront Boyxxx about a group chat referencing his "experience with a college girl." Boyxxx then disclosed what Mxxx had done.
• February 19, 2019 — A psychiatrist conducted a psychological debriefing. Boyxxx showed anxiety, depression, flashbacks, nightmares, and suicidal thoughts, and was diagnosed with Post-Traumatic Stress Disorder (PTSD).
• Defense — Mxxx denied everything, claiming she slept with her siblings while Boyxxx slept elsewhere with his cousin, grandmother, and father (corroborated by her sister and mother). Mxxx's brother (Boyxxx's father) testified that the case was filed only to strip him of custody amid a custody fight with his estranged wife.

• Information for acts of lasciviousness filed against Mxxx; she pleaded not guilty.
• RTC, Branch 5, Manila (December 2, 2022) — Convicted Mxxx of acts of lasciviousness in relation to Section 5(b) of RA 7610. Sentence: 12 years and 1 day to 14 years, 8 months and 1 day of reclusion temporal; civil indemnity, moral damages, and exemplary damages of ₱50,000 each, plus costs and 6% interest.
• Court of Appeals (August 30, 2024; CA-G.R. CR No. 47966) — Affirmed conviction with modification of penalty to 12 years and 1 day to 16 years, 5 months and 9 days of reclusion temporal. Motion for reconsideration denied April 29, 2025.
• Supreme Court — Mxxx filed a Rule 45 Petition for Review.

ISSUES:

1. Procedural — deference to trial court. Does the rule giving deference to the trial court's factual findings cease to apply because the judge who penned the decision was not the judge who tried and heard the witnesses?
2. Credibility. Is the complainant's testimony incredible — and thus insufficient — because his behavior before, during, and after the incident was allegedly contrary to human experience and he supposedly had a propensity to lie?
3. Proper denomination of the crime. Did the Court of Appeals err in convicting petitioner of lascivious conduct under Section 5(b) of RA 7610, rather than of statutory acts of lasciviousness under Article 336 of the RPC?

HELD:

1. No. Deference still applies; the substitute judge's findings stand absent grave abuse of discretion.
2. No. Boyxxx's testimony is clear and credible; a victim need not exhibit a "standard" reaction.
3. Yes (as to the label). Petitioner is guilty, but the proper crime is statutory acts of lasciviousness under Article 336 RPC, not lascivious conduct under Section 5(b) of RA 7610. Conviction AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION.

Doctrine / Ratio Decidendi

1. Substitute-ponente rule. A decision penned by a judge who did not personally hear the witnesses is not thereby unreliable; it will not be disturbed unless there is grave abuse of discretion in the substitute judge's appreciation of the facts, the substitute having had the stenographic transcripts at their disposal. (citing People v. Geralde)

2. No "standard" victim reaction. People vary in how they react to and cope with distress; victims of rape or sexual abuse are not burdened to resist or to react in a standard way under intimidation and emotional stress, and a non-standard reaction does not invalidate their claim. (citing People v. Salazar; People v. Pareja)

3. RA 7610 vs. Article 336 — the consent line (Gramatica). Lascivious conduct under RA 7610 applies only where the minor gives a semblance of consent — albeit flawed — due to the coercion or influence of an adult; "sexual abuse" presupposes a child who engages in (defectively consents to) the conduct. It does not apply where the minor is entirely unable to give legal consent. (applying Gramatica v. People, G.R. Nos. 260233 & 266039, Aug. 12, 2025, En Banc)

4. Capacity to consent fixed by age of consent at the time of the offense. In 2018 the age of consent was 12 (before RA 11648 raised it to 16 in 2022). An 11-year-old is therefore deemed unable to give consent, so RA 7610 Section 5(b) does not apply and the proper crime is statutory acts of lasciviousness under Article 336 RPC — but Section 5(b)'s proviso supplies the penalty (reclusion temporal in its medium period) where the victim is under 12.

5. Why not rape — the gender void in the 2018 rape law. As worded on September 7, 2018, Article 266-A penalized rape (1) by a man having carnal knowledge of a woman, and (2) sexual assault by inserting a penis into another's mouth or anal orifice, or an object into the genital or anal orifice. This left a void where a woman, without consent, places a man's penis into her own vagina — the gendered language excluded the act from "rape," even though carnal knowledge and lack of consent were present. RA 11648 (2022) later replaced "man/woman" with "person," but jurisprudence still conservatively defines carnal knowledge as penetration of the female organ by the male organ. Hence the act fell outside rape and was properly charged as statutory acts of lasciviousness.

On the substitute judge (Part I). The reliability of a decision is not diminished merely because a different judge heard the witnesses, so long as there is no grave abuse of discretion. Here the penning judge had the stenographic transcripts containing everything said at the hearings — an adequate basis for a sound judgment — so the findings were left undisturbed.

On credibility (Part I, cont.). The Court rejected the argument that Boyxxx's conduct was "contrary to human experience." Victims under intimidation and emotional stress are not required to react in any prescribed way. Independently, Boyxxx's narration was clear, consistent, and credible: he detailed being called to the bed, being told to undress and lie down (complying out of fear because Mxxx was older), the placement of a condom (which he identified by its slippery, rubbery feel), and Mxxx mounting him and inserting his penis into her vagina for about ten minutes. This testimony established every factual allegation in the Information.

On the proper offense (Part II). Applying Gramatica, the Court reasoned that RA 7610's "sexual abuse" contemplates a child who engages in the conduct — i.e., who gives a defective, coerced semblance of consent. Because an 11-year-old in 2018 was legally incapable of consent, that semblance was impossible and RA 7610 Section 5(b) could not govern the denomination of the crime. The Court therefore re-labeled the offense as statutory acts of lasciviousness under Article 336 RPC, while still drawing the penalty from Section 5(b)'s proviso for victims under 12.

Penalty computation (Part II, cont.). With no aggravating or mitigating circumstances, the maximum is taken from the medium period of reclusion temporal (14 years, 8 months and 1 day to 17 years and 4 months); the minimum, under the Indeterminate Sentence Law, from the next lower penalty, prision mayor (6 years and 1 day to 12 years). Civil indemnity was raised to ₱150,000 following People v. Jugueta.

Why the acts are not rape, and the call for gender-neutrality (Part III). The Court explained that the 2018 rape law's gendered text excluded a woman who places a man's penis into her vagina, tracing the gendered distinction to the patriarchal origins of rape law (which historically punished men for "stealing" women rather than protecting women's autonomy). Drawing on the ponente's prior concurrences in Garcia v. Drilon and People v. Tulagan, and on People v. Quintos, the Court emphasized that men can also be victims of sexual violence, that rape is fundamentally an issue of power, not gender, and that the law should provide equal protection and resist the stereotype that all women are victims and all men perpetrators. The Court observed that had the genders been swapped, the conduct would have been rape; as the law then stood, however, it fell outside rape's statutory limits — hence the conviction for statutory acts of lasciviousness.

WHEREFORE, the August 30, 2024 Decision and April 29, 2025 Resolution of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR No. 47966 are AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION.

Petitioner Mxxx is found GUILTY of statutory acts of lasciviousness under Article 336 of the Revised Penal Code and sentenced to the indeterminate penalty of nine (9) years, four (4) months and one (1) day of prision mayor, as minimum, to sixteen (16) years, five (5) months and nine (9) days of reclusion temporal, as maximum.

She is ordered to pay Boyxxx: (a) civil indemnity of ₱150,000.00; (b) moral damages of ₱50,000.00; (c) exemplary damages of ₱50,000.00; and (d) costs of suit — all earning 6% interest per annum from finality until fully paid.

Notes

• Controlling framework — Gramatica. This is the operative authority. The dividing line between Article 336 RPC (statutory acts of lasciviousness) and Section 5(b) RA 7610 (lascivious conduct) turns on whether the minor was capable of giving the defective/coerced "semblance of consent" that RA 7610 presupposes. A victim below the age of consent at the time of the offense cannot, so the offense is denominated under Art. 336 — even while the penalty is drawn from RA 7610 Sec. 5(b)'s proviso for victims under 12. Expect this to govern the charging and conviction labels in under-12 cases going forward.

• Penalty mechanics worth memorizing. Conviction under Art. 336 RPC, but penalty = reclusion temporal medium (via the Sec. 5(b) proviso); maximum from the medium period, minimum from prision mayor under the ISLAW; civil indemnity at ₱150,000 per Jugueta.

• Temporal scope — pre-RA 11648 landscape. The result is anchored to 2018 law: age of consent 12, and Art. 266-A's gendered rape text. For offenses on or after March 4, 2022, the age of consent is 16 and Art. 266-A now uses "person." The Court flagged — but did not definitively resolve — that jurisprudence still conservatively defines carnal knowledge as male-on-female penetration. Whether a woman who initiates penile-vaginal penetration of a boy now falls within "rape" post-amendment remains an open question; do not assume it is settled.

• Rejected recurring defenses. Both the substitute-judge challenge and the ill-motive/custody-dispute theory were rejected — useful citable authority when opposing those defenses.

• Caution on the gender-neutrality discussion. Part III's extensive policy argument for gender-neutral rape laws is largely normative/dicta. It is rhetorically powerful for advocacy and law-reform work, but it is not the binding holding (the holding is the Art. 336 denomination and penalty). Flag this distinction before citing those passages as a rule of decision.