Rosalinda A. Penera v. Commission on Elections and Edgar T. Andanar (G.R. No. 181613, November 25, 2009)
SYLLABUS:
A person is only considered a candidate at the start of the campaign period, and unlawful acts applicable to a candidate, such as premature campaigning, can only occur during the campaign period. This interpretation of the election laws, particularly R.A. No. 9369, led the Court to reverse the disqualification of Rosalinda Penera and hold that her participation in the motorcade before the start of the campaign period did not constitute premature campaigning. Therefore, she could not be disqualified under Section 80 of the Omnibus Election Code.
FACTS:
Rosalinda A. Penera ran for the position of Mayor of Sta. Monica, Surigao del Norte, in the May 14, 2007 elections. On March 29, 2007, one day before the official campaign period for local elections, Penera and her political party organized a motorcade that went around different barangays in the municipality. The motorcade was colorful, involving two trucks, motorcycles adorned with balloons, banners, and campaign posters. It also included music playing and candies being thrown to bystanders. During the motorcade, Penera's candidacy for Mayor was publicly announced.
On April 2, 2007, Edgar T. Andanar, a rival candidate for Mayor, filed a petition for disqualification against Penera with the Commission on Elections (COMELEC), alleging that Penera committed premature campaigning by conducting the motorcade before the official start of the campaign period on March 30, 2007. Andanar argued that this act violated Section 80 of the Omnibus Election Code, which prohibits any person from engaging in election campaigning outside the prescribed campaign period.
Penera, in her defense, claimed that the motorcade was not intended as an election campaign but was a mere celebration to accompany the filing of her Certificate of Candidacy (COC). She maintained that no formal speeches or direct solicitation of votes occurred during the motorcade.
The COMELEC Second Division found Penera guilty of premature campaigning. It ruled that the motorcade was a partisan political activity designed to promote her candidacy and, therefore, violated Section 80 of the Omnibus Election Code. As a result, the COMELEC disqualified Penera from running for office. Penera appealed this decision to the COMELEC En Banc, which affirmed her disqualification.
Penera subsequently assumed office as Mayor of Sta. Monica after winning the election, but the legal question regarding her disqualification persisted.
Penera challenged the COMELEC’s ruling before the Supreme Court. Initially, the Court ruled against her, affirming the COMELEC’s decision and upholding her disqualification. However, Penera filed a motion for reconsideration, arguing that she was not yet a candidate at the time of the motorcade and could not be penalized for premature campaigning.
In her motion, Penera cited Republic Act (R.A.) No. 9369, which amended R.A. No. 8436. The law states that a person who files a COC is only considered a candidate at the start of the campaign period. Consequently, Penera contended that she could not have engaged in premature campaigning because she was not yet legally considered a candidate when the motorcade occurred on March 29, 2007, a day before the campaign period began.
ISSUES:
1. Whether or not Penera engaged in premature campaigning.
2. Whether or not she is disqualified from holding office under Section 80 of the Omnibus Election Code.
HELD:
The Supreme Court granted Penera's motion for reconsideration, set aside its earlier decision, and reversed the COMELEC rulings disqualifying her. The Court ruled that she did not commit premature campaigning and allowed her to continue serving as Mayor of Sta. Monica, Surigao del Norte.
Definition of a “Candidate” under R.A. No. 9369:
The critical legal principle revolves around the definition of when a person becomes a “candidate” for election purposes. Under Section 79(a) of the Omnibus Election Code (OEC), a “candidate” is defined as a person who has filed a Certificate of Candidacy (COC) for an elective office. However, this provision must now be read in conjunction with R.A. No. 9369, which amended R.A. No. 8436 to change the point in time when a person is considered a candidate.
The amendment introduced by Section 15 of R.A. No. 8436, as amended by R.A. No. 9369, provides that: (1) A person who files a COC shall only be considered a candidate at the start of the campaign period for which he or she filed the COC; (2) Any unlawful acts or omissions applicable to a candidate (such as premature campaigning) shall take effect only upon the start of the campaign period.
Thus, the legal principle that arose from this provision is that a person is not yet considered a candidate upon filing the COC but only when the campaign period officially starts. This principle directly influenced the outcome of Penera’s case.
Premature Campaigning under Section 80 of the Omnibus Election Code
Section 80 of the Omnibus Election Code prohibits any person from engaging in election campaigning or partisan political activity outside of the designated campaign period. It is an election offense punishable by disqualification from office if the violation is proven. However, R.A. No. 9369 created an important limitation on the application of Section 80.
The legal principle established by R.A. No. 9369 is that unlawful acts, such as premature campaigning, only apply to individuals who are already considered candidates, which happens at the start of the campaign period, not at the filing of the COC. Therefore, a person cannot be penalized for engaging in election activities before the campaign period begins because they are not yet legally considered a candidate at that time.
In Penera’s case, this legal principle was crucial. The Supreme Court ruled that Penera was not yet considered a candidate at the time of the motorcade (March 29, 2007) because the campaign period had not yet started (the campaign period began on March 30, 2007). As a result, her participation in the motorcade, even if considered a political activity, could not be deemed premature campaigning since she was not legally considered a candidate.
Legislative Intent to Prevent Penalizing Acts Before the Campaign Period
The legislative intent behind R.A. No. 9369 was a key element in the Court's reasoning. Congress specifically inserted provisions to limit the application of election offenses to the campaign period in order to (1) Prevent penalizing individuals for actions taken before they are officially considered candidates; (2) Allow ample time for the printing of ballots under the automated election system without prematurely subjecting candidates to election offenses.
The Supreme Court emphasized that the purpose of the early filing of COCs under R.A. No. 8436 was merely to allow sufficient time for ballot printing. It was not intended to subject individuals who filed their COCs early to immediate penalties for election offenses, such as premature campaigning. The law, therefore, created a clear distinction between the filing of the COC and the start of the campaign period.
Constitutional Protection of Freedom of Expression
Another underlying legal principle in the decision is the constitutional protection of freedom of expression. Election campaigning is considered a form of political speech, which is highly protected under the Philippine Constitution. By interpreting R.A. No. 9369 in a way that limits the period during which political acts are punishable as election offenses, the Court also protected the right to free speech and political expression before the start of the campaign period.
The Court explained that any restriction on freedom of expression, such as penalizing premature campaigning, must be clearly supported by law. Since R.A. No. 9369 expressly states that unlawful acts applicable to candidates take effect only during the campaign period, any election-related activity conducted before the campaign period, including Penera's motorcade, cannot be punished.
Harmonization of Statutes
The Supreme Court also applied the principle of harmonization of statutes. It harmonized Section 80 of the Omnibus Election Code (which prohibits premature campaigning) with R.A. No. 9369, which defines when a person is considered a candidate. The Court ruled that while Section 80 remains in force, it must be read in conjunction with the amendments introduced by R.A. No. 9369. Thus, a person can only be held liable for premature campaigning if the unlawful acts occur during the campaign period, when the person is already considered a candidate.
